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Intentional Models as Essential Scientific Tools 
Eric Hochstein 
 
Abstract: In this paper, I argue that the use of scientific models which attribute intentional 
content to complex systems bears a striking similarity to the way in which statistical descriptions 
are used. To demonstrate this, I compare and contrast an intentional model with a statistical 
model, and argue that key similarities between the two give us compelling reasons to consider 
both as a type of phenomenological model. I then demonstrate how intentional descriptions play 
an important role in scientific methodology as a type of phenomenal model, and argue that this 
makes them as essential as any other model of this type. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Intentional concepts (e.g. “representations”, “goals”, “beliefs”, “information”) are commonly 
found as part of scientific models in many different domains. Philosophers of mind and 
philosophers of science, however, have long debated the scientific merits of such models. These 
debates often hinge, either explicitly or implicitly, on whether we can provide a suitable 
metaphysical account of the phenomenon of intentionality, and whether the intentionality 
ascribed to a system is real. Only under these conditions is the application of an intentional 
model thought to be scientifically appropriate (see, for instance: Fodor 1975, 1987, 2008; Field 
1978; Searle 1980, 1992; Dretske 1981; Stich 1983; Churchland 1981; Sarkar 1996, 2000, 2004; 
Adams 2003; Floridi 2005; Weber 2005). 
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 While some philosophers, like Daniel Dennett, argue for a more instrumental account of 
intentional descriptions in science, such accounts often propose that intentional ascriptions have, 
at best, a very limited role to play in our scientific practices. Dennett, for instance, claims that 
while intentional characterizations are useful for generating predictions in day-to-day life, they 
only function as a heuristic device in scientific contexts; one that we ought not take “too 
seriously” (Dennett 1987, p. 350, emphasis in text). Given this, he insists that intentional 
characterizations of human behaviour are ultimately “vacuous as psychology” (1971, p.99).1  
In this paper, I argue that the use of scientific models which attribute intentional content 
to systems (hereafter “intentional models”) are critical to our scientific understanding of systems, 
irrespective of whether we believe the system has genuine metaphysical intentionality or not. 
Instead, I propose that such intentional models are important because they are used analogously 
to the way in which we use phenomenological models.
2
 Given this, I propose we have good 
reason to view intentional models as a species of phenomenological model. 
More specifically, I propose that if we look at the way in which intentional models are 
used within scientific domains, we find that they share a great deal in common with the way in 
which we use statistical models. Given similarities between the two, I propose that we have 
compelling evidence that intentional models are best interpreted as a particular type of 
phenomenological model, just as statistical models are. When understood in this way, the 
scientific value of intentional models can be made clear. Intentional models play an important 
                                                 
1
 It should be noted that, given the prolific nature of Dennett’s work, he is not always consistent regarding this point. 
Overall, however, the idea that intentional descriptions play a restricted role in science has been a strong 
undercurrent throughout Dennett’s work. 
2
 Given that the focus of this paper is specifically on the scientific benefits of intentional concepts as part of 
scientific models, I remain agnostic as to whether the everyday use of intentional language in colloquial contexts can 
be characterized as a phenomenological model as well. There is, however, recent evidence that even the folk 
psychological use of intentional idioms can be understood as something akin to the application of a model, albeit not 
necessarily a scientific one (Maibom 2003, 2009; Godfrey-Smith 2004, 2005).  If such accounts are true, then the 
position I advocate here may apply to intentional descriptions more broadly. 
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role in our discovery and understanding of the implementation of complex systems, and are 
needed to identify features of systems that detailed structural or mechanistic models cannot 
identify. Crucially, the successes of such models are not dependent on whether one is a realist, or 
an instrumentalist, regarding intentionality or intentional states. The value of intentional models 
does not stem from their metaphysical insights, but their epistemic role in scientific practice as a 
type of phenomenological model. 
 I begin in Section 2 by looking at the various sorts of intentional models that exist in 
different scientific domains.  Then, in section 3, I examine the nature of phenomenological 
models, and explain why statistical models are phenomenological models. In Section 4, I select 
an intentional model and a statistical model to compare and contrast. In Section 5, I highlight 
four key similarities that exist between the two types of models, and show why intentional 
models are importantly similar to statistical models to warrant being considered a type of 
phenomenological model. I then demonstrate how intentional models are essential to science as a 
phenomenological model. Lastly, in Section 6, I look at some possible differences between the 
two types of models that may threaten this idea. I demonstrate that these differences are too 
shallow to challenge the account on offer. 
 
2. Intentional Models in Science 
 
While intentional models are most commonly associated with psychology (often used as a means 
of explaining human behaviour via the attribution of mental representations such as “beliefs”, 
“intentions” and “desires”), they are hardly limited to this domain. Intentional models of various 
sorts can be found in a wide range of scientific domains, from psychology (Ajzen 1985, 1988, 
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1991), to neuroscience (Harris, Sheth, & Cohen 2008; Andersen & Cui 2009; Eliasmith et al. 
2012), to artificial intelligence (Parisien & Thagard 2008), to biology (Sterelny,  Smith, & 
Dickison 1996; Sterelny & Griffiths 1999; Maynard Smith 2000), and even to virology: 
 
 We sometimes speak, in a “loose and popular” way, as though viruses have human-like  
beliefs and desires. [...] It comes as no surprise when such intentional idioms occur in the  
hyperbolic prose of the mainstream media. However, it is more surprising when scientific  
discourse relies on anthropomorphizing claims when discussing the nature of viruses. In  
recent papers, it has been suggested that if the HIV “virus wants to resist AZT, it needs to  
make a specific mutation at codon 215 and at another position, such as position 41” 
and that the Hepatitis C virus must try to coexist with its host by reducing its visibility. 
(Huebner 2011, p. 441) 
 
For another example, consider the use of intentional models in neuroscience. In the neuroscience 
of vision, scientists often characterize various neurological mechanisms in terms of the 
intentional information they contain. Certain neurons within a frog’s visual system, for instance, 
are thought to represent, or contain intentional information about, darting black objects in their 
environment (Lettvin et al. 1959). Such appeals to intentional terminology (“representations”, 
“information”) are commonplace in neuroscience. 
 According to many philosophers, the question of whether or not such intentional models 
have an important role to play within scientific practice depends on whether we can tell an 
appropriate metaphysical story about intentionality. Take the case of intentional models in 
virology.  According to Huebner: 
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Philosophical reflection suggests that although we can use intentional idioms whenever 
we find an entity that exhibits robust and systematic patterns of behavior, a plausible 
theory of mentality should not treat viruses as even minimally minded. After all, viruses 
are nothing more than packets of RNA (or sometimes DNA) encased in protein. [...] 
Viruses are not the kind of entities that can want to threaten our wellbeing; they do not 
make plans and adopt deceptive strategies for navigating our immune systems; and they 
have not learned to outsmart our best anti-virals. Although many viruses exhibit 
systematic and predictable patterns of behavior, we can and should treat them as complex 
biological robots. (2011, p. 441) 
 
In this case, Huebner proposes that it is inappropriate to apply intentional models to virology 
because viruses do not have intentional states.  Next, consider models in molecular biology that 
attribute intentional information to genes. According to Marcel Weber: 
 
 I want to exhibit the deeper metaphysical reasons why some common ways of describing 
 the causal role of genes in development and evolution are problematic. Specifically, I 
 show why using the concept of information in an intentional sense in genetics is 
 inappropriate, even given a naturalistic account of intentionality. Furthermore, I argue 
 that descriptions that use notions such as programming, directing or orchestrating are 
 problematic not for empirical reasons, but because they are not strictly causal. They are 
 intentional. (2005, p.407) 
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 As with Huebner above, Weber argues that we ought not use intentional models in 
genetics because we have no reason to assume genes possess the appropriate metaphysical 
properties required for intentionality. A similar argument is also made by Sarkar (2004, p.262).  
In other words, the only way to justify the use of an intentional model in a given scientific 
domain is by first providing a metaphysical account of intentionality. Only then we can 
determine what things genuinely have it, and whether we are justified in describing them that 
way. Yet, I propose that this way of thinking about intentional models is more of an obstacle to 
scientific progress than a part of it. If biologists can, and do, use intentional models, then the 
question is whether such models are useful, and why? The issue of metaphysics is another matter 
altogether. The value of intentional models, I propose, is that they behave within scientific 
practice as a type of phenomenological model. 
 
3. Phenomenological Models and Their Applications 
 
 
In order to demonstrate that intentional models behave akin to phenomenological models, I begin 
this section by providing a brief explanation of what phenomenological models are, and how 
they are typically used in scientific contexts. I then look at two different types of 
phenomenological models to further highlight their similar scientific usage. This will help set the 
stage for a comparison between an intentional model and a standard phenomenological model in 
the following sections. 
 
3.1 Phenomenological models 
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Phenomenological models are defined by their ability to characterize, and predict, a particular 
phenomenon (such as the behaviour of a complex system) without attempting to decompose it 
into physical parts and operations for better understanding. According to Frigg and Hartmann 
(2009), “a traditional definition takes [phenomenological models] to be models that only 
represent observable properties of their targets and refrain from postulating hidden mechanisms 
and the like.”3 A more detailed description, offered by Carl Craver, is that: 
 
…all one requires of a [phenomenological] model is that it be phenomenally adequate. 
That is, the input–output mapping in S [e.g., a postulated algorithm, function, or account, 
that generates a mapping from inputs to outputs] should be sufficiently similar to the 
input–output mapping in T [e.g., the observed regularity in the actual input-output of the 
system] for one’s needs. Few models are actually isomorphic with the phenomenon, 
given that models typically abstract away from the precise details of the system being 
modeled, that they typically are only approximate, and that they make simplifying 
assumptions in order to apply a particular formalism. (2006, p. 357) 
 
Many consider such models to be largely unexplanatory in the sciences of the mind due 
to their focus on characterizing and predicting phenomena instead of developing a mechanistic 
                                                 
3
 It should be noted that this particular definition is vague. It could be interpreted as saying that a phenomenological 
model is used as a means of characterizing directly observable feature(s) of a system, such as behavioural 
regularities, while saying nothing about the unobserved causes of those features/regularities. On the other hand, it 
could be interpreted as saying that a phenomenological model is one that only invokes entities and relations that are 
directly observable (while refraining from references to theoretical posits, or inferred entities). I propose that the 
former definition is more in-line with actual scientific usage than the latter.  Consider that statistical models are 
commonly considered to be phenomenological models, yet they posit boundary conditions which are not directly 
observable features of systems. Likewise, many examples of phenomenological models knowingly invoke 
theoretical unobserved entities. Carl Craver (2006, p.356), for instance, argues that one can use a Ptolemaic model 
of the solar system as a phenomenological model if one is only interested in a predicatively adequate account of 
where the planets will appear in the sky. Yet such a model posits numerous unobservable theoretical entities such as 
equants, deferents, and epicycles (ibid, p. 358). What makes such a model phenomenological is that it is used as a 
means of describing aspects of the systems that are directly observable (like where the planets will appear in the sky) 
while saying nothing about underlying causes, not that it only makes reference to observables entities. Many 
scientific examples of phenomenological models are of this sort. 
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explanation of their production (see: Machamer et al. 2000; Bunge 2003; Bechtel 2008; Darden 
2006; Craver 2006; Wimsatt 2007). Craver, for example, claims that: 
 
 A model can be richly phenomenally adequate and non-explanatory. This is the take-
 home lesson of the several decades of attacks on covering-law models of explanation at 
 the hands of advocates of causal–mechanical models of explanation: merely subsuming a 
 phenomenon under a set of generalizations or an abstract model does not suffice to 
 explain it. (2006, p.357-359) 
 
It should be noted that this view, while widely held, is not without detractors. The 
question of whether phenomenological models can be explanatory in the behavioural sciences is 
still in debate. Some, for instance, have proposed that we need a more pluralistic understanding 
of explanation in order to better account for actual scientific practice in the behavioural sciences 
(Longino 2006; Chemero & Silberstein 2008). What is important to note for the purposes of this 
paper, however, is the fact that we use phenomenological models for different scientific purposes 
than those we use mechanistic models for, irrespective of whether each can be explanatory under 
the appropriate conditions. 
While mechanistic models characterize the physical objects and operations that make up 
a system, phenomenological models are used instead to provide detailed accounts of the 
phenomena produced by mechanisms, to summarize data, to identify similarities that exist across 
vastly different types of mechanistic systems, to identify behavioural regularities, and to make 
predictions (Batterman 2002; Bogen 2005; Craver 2006).
4
 
                                                 
4
 A note of clarification: The way in which I describe a mechanistic model suggests that I am equating 
“mechanisms” with physical parts and operations. Yet, it might be argued that many appropriate scientific uses of 
the term “mechanism” in the life sciences need not be characterized this way. Within psychology, for example, one 
might make reference to learning mechanisms without providing any story of how biological or neurological objects 
are interacting. These are certainly legitimate uses of the term “mechanism”, and my intention is not to stipulate 
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3.2 The Different kinds of phenomenological models 
 
Phenomenological models come in all different shapes and sizes, each useful for characterizing 
and predicting different sorts of phenomena. Statistical models and some dynamical models, for 
instance, provide examples of phenomenological models. Dynamical models involve the 
application of Dynamic Systems Theory (DST) to predict the behaviour of complex systems as 
they change through time. These models use differential equations in order to represent the 
system as a vector moving through a multi-dimensional state space. Dynamical models 
employed by those who embrace a specific form of DST in cognitive science (Busemeyer & 
Townsend 1993; Thelen & Smith 1994; Van Gelder & Port 1995) typically use such models 
phenomenologically: it is “usually only observable behaviour [that] is mapped to the model” 
(Eliasmith, 2010, p. 319). In this respect, many dynamical models in cognitive science act as 
                                                                                                                                                             
correct usage or chastise other common uses of the term.  Instead, my intention is highlight the fact that certain types 
of scientific models (those commonly referred to as “mechanistic” models) are adopted for very particular purposes: 
to identify the physical implementation of a given system. As Eliasmith notes: 
 
In the case of cognitive and brain sciences, useful explanations are those that appeal to subpersonal 
mechanisms [understood in terms of physical parts and operations]. This is because it is precisely such 
explanations which provide a basis for both intervention in behaviour and the artificial reproduction of 
those behaviours. These mechanisms must be specific enough to allow for intervention. That is, the 
mechanisms must be specified in a way that relates to the measurable and manipulable properties of the 
system. (2010, pp. 316) 
 
If we are only talking about a mechanism at an abstract level without appealing to parts and operations, our model 
may tell us behavioural patterns and regularities, but provides no insight into why such regularities exist as they do 
or how they might change under different conditions. For this reason, some argue that scientific models which 
employ the more abstract usage of the term “mechanism” tend to behave more as phenomenological models 
(Machamer et al. 2000; Craver 2006). In contrast, the application of mechanistic models are expressly employed for 
the purposes of telling us how a given system is being physically instantiated, and thus provides an account of why 
the system behaves as it does.  It is this usage of the term “mechanism”, and “mechanistic model”, that I am 
appealing to for the purposes of this paper (for more details, see: Machamer et al. 2000; Bunge 2003; Bechtel 2005, 
2007, 2008; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2007; Glennan 2005; Darden 2006; Craver 2006, 2007; Thagard 2006, 2009, 
2012; Wimsatt 2007; Eliasmith 2010). 
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phenomenological models, providing no mechanistic explanation for the behaviour of the 
system.
5
 
Statistical models, meanwhile, act as a different sort of phenomenological model. While 
dynamical models generate predictions by applying an appropriate set of differential equations, 
statistical models typically predict by assigning various probabilities to measurable states of the 
system given known conditions. This allows us to identify regularities in the data we collect 
about systems, and to use them as a means of generating predictions (for details, see Eliasmith 
2010). 
Given that different sorts of phenomenological models characterize systems in different 
ways, one type of model may be more useful than another for our purposes given the particular 
dataset we have available to us at any given time. We might, for instance, lack the relevant 
information needed to construct a dynamical model of a system, but not a statistical one. Or vice 
versa. 
Statistical models and dynamical models of the sort discussed above are united by the 
fact that they stay silent in regards to the physical implementation of the systems they describe, 
and are instead used for tasks such as prediction, data analysis, and the identification of 
behavioural patterns. If I am to show that scientific ascriptions of intentional content function as 
a type of phenomenological model, then I need to demonstrate how intentional models are 
crucially similar to dynamical and statistical models to warrant being subsumed under the same 
category of model.  However, I must also show how they differ so as to make intentional models 
useful in scientific contexts where dynamical and statistical models are not. To accomplish this, I 
begin by selecting an intentional model, and a statistical model, to compare and contrast. 
                                                 
5
 Given that we use dynamical models for different purposes that those we use mechanistic models for, there is often 
thought to be no tension between the two types of models. For more details, see Kaplan & Bechtel 2011. 
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4. Statistical and intentional models 
 
To argue that statistical and intentional models share crucial similarities, in this section I briefly 
introduce an example of each kind of model. This introduction is followed by an examination of 
the similarities between these examples, where additional details about each model are provided. 
 
4.1 Example of a Statistical Model 
 
As an example of a statistical model, consider what is often called the “Thompson Effect”. This 
is the phenomenon in which objects appear to us to move faster or slower based on how greatly 
the object contrasts with its surrounding environment. Alan Stocker and Eero Simoncelli (2006) 
developed a statistical model that can accurately predict how fast an object will appear to be 
moving to an observer given the level of contrast between the object and its surrounding 
environment. They did this by altering the modern framework of statistical estimation used to 
traditionally model perception. This traditional framework viewed an optimal observer in terms 
of two probability distributions: 
 
First, the variability of a set of measurements, m, is specified as a conditional probability 
distribution, p(m|v), where v is the stimulus speed. The variability is due to a combination 
of external sources (e.g., photon noise) as well as internal sources (e.g., neural response 
variability). When considered as a function of v for a particular measurement, this 
conditional density is known as a likelihood function. The second component is a prior 
probability distribution, p(v), which specifies the probability of encountering stimuli 
moving at any particular retinal speed. According to Bayes’ rule, the product of these two 
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components (when appropriately normalized) gives the posterior distribution. Common 
choices are the mean, or the mode. Biases in the perceived speed of low-contrast moving 
patterns arise intrinsically with this model, assuming a prior that favors low speeds: 
Lower contrast stimuli lead to noisier measurements, producing a broader likelihood 
function, which leads to a lower speed estimate. (Stocker & Simoncelli 2006, p. 578) 
 
 The problem with this traditional model is that it is extremely difficult to experimentally 
determine what the prior distribution and the likelihood function actually are. Similarly, there are 
constraints on the model that cast doubt on its ability to accurately represent the phenomenon in 
question (Stocker & Simoncelli 2006, p. 578). To compensate for this, Stocker and Simoncelli 
embed a Bayesian estimator into the traditional model. This estimator is calibrated based on the 
trial-by-trial responses of subjects observed in a forced choice speed discrimination experiment. 
According to Stocker & Simoncelli: 
 
We were able to validate the ability of a Bayesian observer model to account for the data, 
and also to determine the prior distribution and internal noise level associated with the 
best-fitting Bayesian estimation model. (2006, p. 579) 
 
 By embedding the Bayesian estimator into the traditional model of perception, Stocker 
and Simoncelli were able to generate a predictive model that overcomes the shortcomings of 
previous statistical accounts of the phenomenon. Most importantly for our purposes, however, is 
the fact that their model does not provide any mechanistic story for what generates the 
Thompson Effect, but still accurately predicts the performance of subjects in a wide range of 
tasks. In this regard, statistical models like Stocker & Simoncelli’s model function as a type of 
phenomenological model.  
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4.2 Example of an Intentional Model 
 
For an example of an intentional model, let us turn to molecular biology.  It is common practice 
in molecular biology to attribute information to genes regarding phenotypic traits.  However, the 
way in which “information” is understood can often be unclear.  There are technical, non-
intentional, senses of information associated with communication theory (such as Shannon-
Weaver information), and models that attribute this sort of information to genes do have an 
important place in biology. However, the models that attribute phenotypic information to genes 
are often not usefully characterized in terms of Shannon-Weaver information (Sterelny & 
Griffiths 1999, p. 104; Godfrey-Smith 2000; Maynard Smith 2000; Sterelny 2000, p. 196; Sarkar 
2004; Weber 2005).  Instead, these biological models are best understood as employing a 
distinctly intentional notion of information: 
 
 A single nucleotide substitution can destroy the genetic information of a gene, for 
 example, if it leads to the insertion of a stop codon. But the mutant DNA sequence still 
 contains the same amount of Shannon-Weaver information. What this suggests is that 
 ‘information’ is actually used in an intentional or semantic sense, that is, in a similar or 
 even the same sense in which we say about English sentences that they contain 
 information. (Weber 2005, p.410). 
 
While Weber ultimately calls into question the scientific merits of these models given that we 
have no metaphysical grounds to suppose that genes have genuine semantic properties, many 
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have espoused the essential methodological virtues of employing such intentional models in 
biology, irrespective of their metaphysical standings (Sereno 1991; Sterelny, Smith, & Dickison 
1996; Ji 1997, 1999; Sterelny & Griffiths 1999; Maynard Smith 2000; Sterelny 2000).
6
 I will 
demonstrate that the virtues associated with such models mirror the virtues that apply to 
statistical models like Stocker & Simoncelli’s model. Moreover, the metaphysical question of 
whether genes genuinely have intentionality is ultimately irrelevant to whether the model has the 
scientific virtues of a phenomenological model. 
 
5. Similarities Between Intentional and Statistical Models 
 
In this section I argue for four crucial traits that are shared by intentional and statistical models. I 
will use the Stocker and Simoncelli statistical model, and information models from molecular 
biology, to demonstrate how both types of models exhibit these traits. 
 
5.1 Neither model directly describes the physical mechanisms of a system 
 
Statistical models, being a species of phenomenological model, characterize systems without 
telling us about their underlying causal mechanisms. As Eliasmith notes: 
 
                                                 
6
 It is also important to note that the attribution of intentional information to genes is not a case of mere casual 
anthropomorphism on the part of biologists, but are part of genuine scientific models. As John Maynard Smith 
notes: 
 
 Transcription, translation, code, redundancy, synonymous, messenger, editing, proofreading, library - these 
 are all technical terms in biology. I am not aware of any confusions arising because their meanings are not 
 understood.  In fact, the similarities between their meanings when referring to human communication  and 
 genetics are surprisingly close. (Maynard Smith 2000, p.178) 
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Statistical descriptions are highly implementation independent. Statistical models focus 
on describing the regularities in the data and hence are silent with respect to the particular 
physical implementation. In essence, these descriptions would not change if the 
implementation changes and statistical properties do not. (2010, p. 315) 
 
Intentional models are similarly implementation independent. To say that the haemoglobin-S 
gene carries information, or instructions, for the sickle cell trait does not, by itself, tell us what 
mechanisms are at work in the implementation of these “instructions”.  This is why John 
Maynard Smith points out that “the weakness of these models [...] is that they do not tell us 
where the ‘rules’ [for these genetic programs or instructions] come from” (2000, p.190). They 
do, however, allow us to identify regularities in the data we gather about biological system when 
we know relevant environmental conditions. 
 
5.2 Both models generate predictions of systems despite a lack of mechanistic assumptions 
 
We use both statistical and intentional models to form predictions of systems whose mechanisms 
we do not yet understand, or cannot identify. Stocker and Simoncelli’s statistical model can 
predict the Thompson Effect despite a lack of information regarding the actual mechanisms 
generating it. In fact, one of the primary benefits of statistical models is that they allow us to 
generate predictions of systems with unknown mechanisms. We often explicitly use statistical 
models for the purpose of modeling systems that we cannot explain or predict mechanistically 
(Eliasmith 2010, p.315).  
 The same is true of intentional models. The use of intentional models in genetics are 
often used to make powerful and important predictions. Sereno, for instance, notes that the use of 
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intentional models in genetics can be used “to make preliminary predictions about [...] some 
presently hidden mechanisms” (1991, p.19). Maynard Smith similarly argues that it is common 
practice for biologists to attribute intentional information (in the form of the genetic code) to 
DNA as a means of predicting amino acid sequences (2000, p.184). Likewise, Godfrey-Smith 
points out that through the application of such models, “generalizations can be made about the 
division of labor between the different kinds of maco-molecules in cells (proteins, carbohydrates, 
lipids, and nucleic acides)” (2000, p.204). In these cases, even though the intentional model by 
itself does not describe the physical implementations of the system, it allows us to generate 
relevant scientific predictions. 
 
5.3 Both models are used to help us learn about unknown causal mechanisms 
 
If we are trying to learn about the unknown mechanisms of a system, one good way to do this is 
by understanding the behavioural regularities produced by these mechanisms. Statistical and 
intentional models are useful for exactly this purpose. Our ability to effectively characterize and 
predict the behaviour of a system allows us to narrow the list of possible mechanisms that might 
be implementing it. Take, for example, Stocker & Simoncelli’s model. While their account does 
not tell us what the mechanisms underlying the system are, it does provide insights into possible 
mechanisms: 
 
The form of the contrast-dependent measurement noise in our model suggests that the 
locus of representation for measurements m is likely to be cortical. Neurons in area MT 
are a natural choice: They are highly motion selective, and their responses have been 
directly linked to perception. (2006, p. 583) 
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 Even though Stocker & Simoncelli’s model does not directly describe the neurological 
mechanisms responsible for the Thompson Effect, by describing and predicting the phenomenon 
in a detailed way, it provides insights into what the mechanisms must be like. The more detailed 
our account of the phenomenon, the more it tells us about what the unknown mechanisms must 
be capable of producing given known constraints. And this in turn helps us narrow the field of 
possible mechanisms. In this case, it means that whatever mechanisms are responsible for 
producing the Thompson Effect must meet the regularities observed by Stocker & Simoncelli’s 
model. 
 Now let us turn to intentional models. Historically, intentional models that characterized 
genes in terms of a genetic code were pivotal in the discovery of causal mechanisms in molecular 
biology. For example: 
 
 [The] discovery of the relationship between DNA and protein –as a triplet code in which 
 the correct ‘reading frame’ is maintained by accurately counting off in threes, and whose 
 meaning can be destroyed by a ‘frame shift’ mutation [...] arose from the coding analogy. 
 (Maynard Smith 2000, p. 184) 
 
Even those who are skeptical of the role that such intentional models currently play in biology 
are quick to acknowledge that such models have proven extremely important in the development 
of molecular biology as a means of discovering and understanding the mechanistic 
underpinnings of biological systems (see, for instance, Sarker 2000, 2004; Weber 2005). 
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 Intentional models, in virtue of being predictive, provide us with essential information 
that allows us to narrow down the set of possible mechanisms producing those behaviours. Given 
environmental restrictions, not any implementation of a physical system will be capable of 
producing the behaviours identified and predicted by an intentional model under those 
conditions.  In this respect, by highlighting behavioural regularities displayed by the system 
given known environmental conditions, intentional models help us to reverse engineer systems 
by identifying constraints on the set of possible causal mechanisms. 
 
5.4 Generating a mechanistic account of a system does not necessarily make either model 
obsolete 
 
While both statistical and intentional models are used to help generate mechanistic accounts of 
systems, this does not imply that such models become obsolete the moment we have a 
mechanistic account in hand. We use different scientific models for different purposes. And 
while mechanistic models are ideal for characterizing the structure of systems, this does not 
mean they are ideal for other sorts of purposes. 
For example, the model that is best for characterizing the mechanisms of a system is not 
necessarily the best model to use for generating predictions. As Mark Wilson notes, “the 
reasoning requirements natural to design tasks are often quite different than those pertinent to 
prediction et al. and greatly influence the descriptive vocabulary we find suitable” (Wilson, 
2006, p. 326). Knowing the mechanisms that produce the Thompson Effect, for instance, does 
not mean that we do not use a statistical model like Stocker & Simoncelli’s in order to predict the 
effect. Practical constraints on scientific practice often mean that statistical models are ideal for 
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scientific predictions when restrictions on time and resources make mechanistic models 
inefficient or impractical.  And the same lesson applies to intentional models. 
Consider the problems that faced the neuroscience of vision in the mid-20
th
 century. The 
neurological mechanisms responsible for vision were exceedingly difficult to predict based only 
on a mechanistic understanding of the system. It was not until neuroscientists began attributing 
intentional content to neurological systems that relevant predictions could be made (Marr 1982; 
Betchel 2007, p. 184). Certain neurons, for example, were found to contain visual information 
about the edges of objects in one’s visual field. According to David Marr, this information 
needed to be “analyzed and understood in a way that [was] independent of the particular 
mechanisms and structures that implement them in our head” (Marr 1982, p. 19).  Only by 
intentionally modeling the system could we generate relevant predictions. 
 Likewise, there is evidence that intentional models in biology may possess similar 
virtues.
7
  Even if we could, in principle, do away with intentional models in favour of 
mechanistic ones in molecular biology, the pragmatic benefits intentional models provide in 
practice may justify their continued usage. Consider Sarkar’s observation that: 
 
 Routinely, talk of information is intertwined with linguistic metaphors, from both natural 
 and artificial languages. [...] The use of such talk is so pervasive that it almost seems 
 impossible that, short of pathological convolution, the experimental results of genetics 
 can even be communicated without these resources. (2004, p. 266) 
 
Further evidence for this may be seen in Dennett’s claim that: 
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 Although for a contrasting view, see Sarkar 1996, 2000; Weber 2005. 
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Pending completion of our mechanical knowledge, we need the intentional 
 characterizations of biology to keep track of what we are trying to explain, and even after 
 we have all our mechanical explanations in place, we will continue to need the intentional 
 level against which to measure the bargains Mother Nature has struck. (1987, p.315) 
 
In a similar vein, it has recently been argued that models in physics which disregard the 
structural details of physical systems (just as statistical and intentional models do) can have 
profound virtues over their mechanistic counterparts.  Robert Batterman, for example, argues 
that a model that ignores many of the correct structural details of a system can often be a better 
candidate for characterizing certain behavioural regularities than those that provide a fine-
grained account of the system’s mechanisms. As an example, Batterman points to our use of the 
fundamental theories of statistical mechanics to characterize phase transitions, like water turning 
from liquid to ice: 
 
From the point of view of the underlying fundamental theory whose proper focus is on 
the interactions of a finite number of molecular components of the macrosystems, these 
qualitative changes are genuinely novel. The upshot is that the statistical mechanics of 
finite systems is explanatorily insufficient. While it gets the ontology of blobs of gases 
and fluids right (they are composed of a finite number of interacting molecules), there 
remain macroscopic phenomena —universal patterns of behavior— that cannot be 
explained by this fundamental theory. (2011, pp. 1033-1034) 
 
Put simply, a model that provides a detailed structural account of the system (identifying the 
finite molecules that make up the system, and their interactions) fails to identify or account for 
the phenomenon of phase transitions. The only way for us to successfully model this behavioural 
pattern of water is by interpreting the system as having an infinite number of molecules (which 
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we know it does not have). In other words, many of the correct structural details of the system 
must be left aside in order for us to accurately predict the behavioural regularity produced by the 
system. In such cases, mechanistic details “actually detract from an understanding of the 
phenomenon” (Batterman 2002, p.22). 
 Models like intentional and statistical models are often used to represent and predict the 
behavioural regularities produced by systems, while mechanistic models are used to represent 
their internal parts and operations. In this regard, the different types of models are used to 
represent different aspects of systems for different purposes, and so have different pragmatic 
virtues. 
 
5.5 Given these shared traits, both models function as a species of phenomenological model 
  
The similarities listed above between statistical and intentional models provide evidence for my 
contention that intentional models function within scientific practice as a type of 
phenomenological model. Consider that a benefit of both statistical and intentional models is that 
they allow us to generate predictions of systems whose mechanisms we cannot identify or do not 
fully understand. In other words, both models are implementation independent. This is one of the 
defining features of phenomenological models: “[They] are a means for extracting stable 
phenomenologies from unknown, and perhaps unknowable detailed theories” (Batterman 2002, 
p. 35, emphasis in text). 
 Recall that phenomenological models come in all shapes and sizes, each useful in 
different contexts and for different purposes (e.g. dynamical versus statistical descriptions). 
Intentional models are simply another breed of phenomenological model, one useful for 
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characterizing and predicting behaviour that other models are not well suited for. For instance, 
intentional models allow us to generate predictions when we do not have the luxury or ability to 
quantify over relevant features of the system needed to generate statistical or dynamical models.  
If we understand intentional models not as descriptions of the structure of systems, but 
instead as a species of phenomenological model, then their role in science becomes much clearer. 
They play an important role in our discovery, and understanding, of the mechanisms that 
constitute complex systems. They similarly allow us to identify behavioural patterns, and 
generate essential predictions, in contexts where other sorts of models are either unavailable or 
unsuitable. These scientific virtues of intentional models do not in any way require that we have 
a metaphysical story of what intentionality is, how it works, or whether we are 
realists/antirealists regarding intentional states. Yet these virtues are more than enough to 
validate the presence of such models in scientific domains. 
 
6. Differences between Statistical Models and Intentional Models 
 
Up until this point, I have focused only on the similarities between intentional and statistical 
models to make my case. In order to defend the claim that they are relevantly similar, I must also 
rule out any key dissimilarities between the two that might disqualify intentional models from 
being a type of phenomenological model. In this section, I examine such dissimilarities and 
demonstrate that they are not a threat to the account I provide above. 
 
6.1 We use intentional models to explain behaviour, not just predict it 
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The first important difference to note is that while we commonly explain behaviour by appealing 
to intentional models, we typically do not explain behaviour by appealing to statistical models. 
Stocker & Simoncelli’s model is not considered to be an explanation of the Thompson Effect, 
but only a means of predicting it. Intentional models, on the other hand, are commonly used for 
predictions and explanations. 
 Consider intentional models in psychology. We do not only predict people’s behaviour 
with the attribution of beliefs and desires, but explain it as well. We can say that John votes for 
the New Democratic Party of Canada because of his beliefs, intentions, and desires. In this 
regard, intentional models do not seem to function the way statistical models do given that they 
are often explanatory as well as predictive. 
 This distinction between statistical and intentional models is ultimately not a sufficient 
reason to think that intentional models are not phenomenological models. While it is true that we 
often do not use statistical models to generate explanations in the behavioural sciences, this does 
not mean that we do not use phenomenological models of any sort to provide explanations in 
these domains. It has been argued that, depending on the question being asked, and the particular 
phenomenon under investigation, phenomenological models often do provide us with scientific 
explanations (Chemero & Silberstein 2008). Similarly, Batterman argues that since some 
phenomena can only be seen and characterized using phenomenological models, that we ought to 
consider such models to be explanatory despite their mischaracterizations, or agnosticism, 
regarding the underlying implementation of the system (Batterman 2000, 2002). 
 But even if we were to suppose that mechanistic models are the best explanatory accounts 
in the life sciences (as some do), this would still not be enough to challenge the idea that 
intentional models behave as phenomenological models in these domains. Even if 
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phenomenological models are insufficient to function as rigorous scientific explanations, this 
does not mean that they would have no explanatory power whatsoever. In virtue of being 
predictive, such models still provide a degree of explanatory power (Dennett 1987, p. 259). 
 According to Craver, one of the reasons that mechanistic models are explanatory in the 
life sciences is that they “afford the ability to say not merely how the system in fact behaves, but 
to say how it will behave under a variety of interventions” (Craver 2006, p. 358, emphasis in 
text). Explanations tell us not only what the system’s actual behaviour is, but also what it would 
be in counter-factual situations. Phenomenological models, in virtue of summarizing and 
predicting the phenomenon under investigation, still “typically allow one to answer some 
[“what-if-things-had-been-different”]-questions” (Craver, 2006, p. 358). In this respect, such 
models still provide us with limited explanations, even if we work on the assumption that they 
are always insufficient to provide many robust scientific explanations. And so the fact that 
intentional accounts are used to provide explanations does not disqualify them as 
phenomenological models, it simply means that they might provide only a constrained or limited 
sort of explanation. 
 
6.2 Intentional models are normative, statistical models are not 
 
It has been argued that intentional models are ill-equipped to play a role in scientific practice 
because they make predictions based not on how systems genuinely function, but only on how 
the system ought to behave if it were rational. In this respect, unlike statistical models, 
intentional models are inherently normative, and not descriptive like other models in science. To 
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better understand this particular objection, let us consider intentional models from domains like 
psychology: 
 
 There is a normative character to our practices of mental state ascription that is foreign to 
 the theories involving natural kinds in the sciences. The normative aspect of mental state 
 ascription can be seen in several related ways. Most generally, when we ascribe mental 
 states, we do so against the background assumption that we are dealing with a rational 
 agent; i.e., we attribute propositional attitudes to an agent against our background 
 conception of what she ought to believe and desire. [...] Attributing a completely 
 irrational set of beliefs to an agent defeats the purpose of belief attribution, and the 
 attribution itself loses sense. [...] However, scientific theorizing does not appeal to overtly 
 normative standards in the way that mental state ascription does. Our choice of theories is 
 not guided by an ideal conception of how the world ought to behave. (Sehon 1997, 
 p.334). 
 
 The problem with this sort of objection is that it mischaracterizes actual scientific 
practice. I propose that intentional models are in fact no different from our use of other kinds of 
idealized models in science. Recall the example of phase transitions discussed in section 5.4. 
When we use statistical mechanics to model the behaviour of phase transitions, we are guided by 
an ideal conception of how the world ought to behave. Instead of modeling the system the way it 
genuinely is, we model it against the background assumption that it can have properties like an 
infinite number of molecular components, or infinite volume. So just as intentional models only 
describe the way a system ought to act if it were rational, so too does statistical mechanics only 
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describe how a system ought to act if it had an infinite volume. In neither case is the model 
strictly descriptive, since idealizations are required in both cases to make the relevant scientific 
predictions.  And so I propose that the “rationality” case involving intentional models is just 
another variety of the same sort of idealization found in phenomenological models in other 
domains of science. 
In summation, the potential dissimilarities discussed in this section fail to provide 
compelling evidence for the idea that statistical models and intentional models cannot be 
examples of the same type of scientific model.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
I have argued that intentional models are best understood as a type of phenomenological model 
when used in scientific practice. To provide support for this idea, I have highlighted the 
numerous similarities that exist between intentional models and statistical models.  Both models 
are implementation independent.  Both models are used to generate predictions of complex 
systems with unknown mechanisms. Both models play an important role in the discovery and 
understanding of the mechanisms that make up complex systems. And both models are used in 
contexts where mechanistic models are unhelpful or unavailable. These are all key features of 
phenomenological models. Likewise, these virtues do not require that we take any stand 
whatsoever regarding the realism of intentionality or intentional states. 
 This means that, regardless of whether we wish to be realists or anti-realists about 
intentionality, intentional models play an essential practical role in our scientific practices. The 
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information they provide is invaluable in helping us to learn how complex systems are 
implemented, and how they behave. 
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